Description Details
This study analyzes the use of airpower against enemy ground forces. Maj Scott G.Walker assesses current doctrinal definitions of the close air support and interdiction missions as seen by the Air Force and Army, comparing and contrasting the two. The themes that recur throughout are the need for planning to remain flexible, using the speed and firepower of air attack to concentrate force where needed, and the requirement for good operational and tactical intelligence....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 THE FIELD ARMY DESCRIBED . . . . 9 ATTACKING THE ENEMY . . . . . 19 SYNCHRONIZING AIR AND GROUND FORCES . . . . . 39 CASE STUDIES . . . . 45 AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS . . . . 71...

Description Details
In the end, the theories we considered can be synthesized to form a better overall description of the control of combat airpower. Centralized control and decentralized execution is a good concept at any level, but it suffers from lack of precision....

Description Details
This paper examines the long development of precision guided bombs to show that the accuracy attained in Desert Storm was an evolution not a revolution in aerial warfare. This evolution continues and gives offensive airpower the advantage over the defense. Guided bomb development started during World War One with the “aerial torpedo”. When Desert Storm initiated in 1991 there were very few guided weapons that had not been extensively tested on training ranges and in combat. The precision demonstrated to the World during Desert Storm started evolving when airpower was first envisioned as a new dimension for conducting war, and was far from a revolution. Now, the continued development of imaging infrared, laser radar, synthetic aperture radar, and millimeter wave radar autonomous seekers further increases the flexibility, range, and effectiveness of guided bombs....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION........1 EARLY GUIDED BOMBS THROUGH WORLD WAR TWO........3 World War One........3 Post World War One........4 World War Two........5 THE KOREAN WAR........19 THE VIETNAM WAR........22 Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs)........22 Electro-optical Guided Bombs........30 THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE 1970s........32 THE 1980s AND THE LIBYA RAID........35 DESERT STORM AND THE 1990s........38 Current Development Projects........41 EPILOGUE........48...

Description Details
The purpose of this thesis is to determine which form of airpower will best serve American power projection requirements as we approach the turn of the century. It examines three forms of airpower: carrier air, long-range combat air (B-2), and theater air (i.e., F-15, F-16, and EF-111). The author concludes that theater aircraft are the mainstay of US airpower. Theater airpower was the decisive form of airpower in our three major conflicts since World War II (Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq) and will be in the regional conflicts of the future. It is superior in the broadest sense of the word—economically, militarily, and politically....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 FUNDING, AIRPOWER, AND POWER PROJECTION . . . . 2 CRITERIA . . . 4 FIXED-COST COMPOSITION OF EACH AIRPOWER INSTRUMENT . . . . . 8 ORDNANCE LOAD . . . . 12 ORDNANCE FLEXIBILITY . . . 16 MISSION FLEXIBILITY . . . . . 18 ANALYSIS . . . . . . 23 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . 26 NOTES . . . . . 29...

Description Details
During the Lebanon conflict, the IAF employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations. This paper finds that Army and Air Force airpower theory and doctrine have converged at the operational level of warfare. The kernel of a future airpower theory may be found in two propositions. The first is the general agreement between the Army and the Air Force that airpower can provide important, potentially decisive ...

Description Details
This study first provides a general discussion of peacekeeping and constructs a comprehensive framework to categorize and analyze the role of air power in peacekeeping. Next, several recommendations are presented concerning command and control, doctrine, and organizational issues. In the end, this study concludes that the role of air power in peacekeeping is primarily auxiliary. Nevertheless, among the potential US contributions to UN peacekeeping, air power may be the best medium as it offers capabilities different from those currently available to UN forces. Moreover, the use of airpower, as opposed to ground peacekeeping forces, will reduce the risk to American lives. Finally, the expanded use of air power in UN peacekeeping presents an opportunity to demonstrate US leadership and resolve while avoiding the perception of dominating the show. ...

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 2 2 DISCUSSION OF PEACEKEEPING . . . . 5 Peacekeeping Defined . . . . . . . 6 The Use of Force for Self-defense . . . . . 6 The Principles of Consent and Impartiality . . . . 7 Principle of Effective Military Support . . . . . . 8 Additional Principles . . . . 8 Peacekeeping and International Conflict Control . . . . . 8 Peacekeeping in the 21st Century . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . 12 3 AIR POWER AND PEACEKEEPING . . . . 15 Operational Analysis . . . . 17 Command and Control . . . . . . . 17 Communications . . . . . . 19 Intelligence . . . . . 21 Mobility . . . . . . . 24 Force Protection . . . . . . 26 Putting It Together—Military Effectiveness . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . 28 4 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . 34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 37 Notes . . . . 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . 39...

Description Details
This study analyzes the asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower across the political, operational, and tactical levels of war and examines whether the U.S. has adequately prepared itself to counter asymmetrical measures against its airpower assets. The answers are not reassuring....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION.......1 The Question.......2 Background and Significance of the Problem.....2 Limitations of the Study..... 4 Methodology.......5 Terminology.....6 Preview of the Argument.....7 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL....... 10 Propaganda.....11 Coalition Busting..... 15 Enemy Measures to Change U.S. Targeting Strategy.......22 Conclusion.....25 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.......28 Attacking Airpower on the Ramp.......30 Aircraft Carriers.....33 Deception.....36 Urban Warfare.....39 Conclusion..... 42 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL.....44 The Israeli Experience..... 45 MANPADS.......48 The Laser Threat.......51 Conclusion..... 54 CONCLUSIONS.......57...

Description Details
This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products....

Table of Contents Details
1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35 ...

Description Details
Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...